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Abstract 
This paper advances the risk management perspective that superior social performance enhances firm value by serving as 
an ex ante valuable insurance mechanism. We posit that good social performance is more valuable as an insurance 
mechanism for firms with higher litigation risks. Moreover, value generation of corporate social performance (CSP) 
depends on whether a firm has gained pragmatic legitimacy (i.e., a firm’s financial health) and moral legitimacy (i.e., 
whether or not a firm operates in a socially contested industry) among its stakeholders. We find that the value of CSP as 
insurance against litigation risk is practically significant, adding 2 to 4 percent to firm value. But CSP is less likely to 
create value if the firm is in financial distress or is operating in socially contested industries. 
Keywords: 
corporate social performance, insurance value, risk management, firm valuation models, legitimacy 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
While the assertion is not without controversy, recent developments in business and society seem to suggest that a 
corporation’s social performance (CSP) is positively associated with its financial performance (CFP) (e.g., Berman et 
al., 1999; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes, 2003; Waddock and Graves, 1997). Many studies 
suggest that an important mechanism that links CSP with CFP is that CSP improves a firm’s reputation and brand image. 
But relatively little attention has been paid to another potential linkage—CSP can function as an insurance mechanism 
that mitigates the decline in firm value when a firm encounters negative developments (Fombrun, Gardberg, and 
Barnett, 2000; Godfrey, 2005; Husted, 2005; Schnietz and Epstein, 2005). 
The general argument as to how CSP might work as an insurance mechanism is that it can build positive moral capital 
among various stakeholders.1 Moral capital is defined as the outcome of the process of assessment, evaluation, and 
imputation by stakeholders of a firm’s CSP, which can help temper stakeholders’ negative judgments and their sanctions 
when adverse developments materialize (Godfrey, 2005). However, prior research on CSP from the risk management 
perspective has mostly taken an ex post perspective, discussing and examining ex post value loss as a result of the 
negative events (e.g., Bansal and Clelland, 2004; Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen, 2009; Klein and Dawar, 2004; Schnietz 
and Epstein, 2005). Godfrey et al. (2009), for instance, use a sample of firms that had experienced negative legal or 
                                                          
1
 ‘Stakeholders’ refers to any group or individual who can affect, or is affected by, the achievement of the organization's objectives. As 
in previous studies, this typically includes employees, customers, shareholders, suppliers, and the community (Freeman, 1984). 
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regulatory action and examine the effectiveness of their prior CSP as an insurance mechanism. They show that a firm’s 
CSP is associated with smaller decreases in firm value as a result of the negative events. 
But such ex post insurance benefits are only half of the picture. It remains unclear whether the insurance characteristics 
of CSP are valuable even when no negative event has taken place. Just as an insurance policy’s effectiveness in insuring 
against certain risks does not always justify its purchase ex ante (otherwise, everyone should buy all available insurance 
policies), the fact that superior CSP may eventually help mitigate loss from negative events does not necessarily provide 
sufficient financial justification for a firm’s spending to ensure good CSP ex ante. Questions about whether and when 
CSP is likely to enhance ex ante firm value, therefore, remain unanswered by prior research in this area. 
The aims of this study are twofold. The first is to establish the insurance value of CSP by assessing whether or not firms 
facing high levels of litigation risk are more likely ex ante to benefit from CSP as an insurance mechanism. The 
fundamental argument is that the extent to which CSP enhances firm value depends on the probability that the firm will 
use the ‘insurance’ in the future which, in turn, depends on the firm’s risk exposures. If a firm is at high risk of 
experiencing negative events, it has a greater need for insurance protection and, thus, is more likely to benefit from CSP 
to the extent that it functions as an insurance mechanism. In particular, for firms operating in a litigious industry, they are 
likely to benefit more from CSP, as the likelihood of the firm incurring severe litigation cost is higher and the insurance 
protection from CSP would decrease the overall severity of sanctions from stakeholders if litigation occurs (Godfrey et 
al., 2009). This study, therefore, adopts the risk management perspective on CSP by identifying CSP as an insurance 
mechanism and sets out to demonstrate how and to what extent CSP creates more value for firms at significant risk of 
litigation. 
The second aim of the study is to look into the limits on CSP’s value enhancement. Building on organizational legitimacy 
literature, we argue that because stakeholders’ perceptions of a firm’s CSP are critical for any value generation of CSP, 
the extent to which CSP can enhance firm value will depend on the extent to which the firm can gain legitimacy among 
its stakeholders (Suchman, 1995). Two types of legitimacy are relevant for this discussion: pragmatic legitimacy and 
moral legitimacy. Pragmatic legitimacy is established based on the audience’s self-interest. It reflects stakeholders’ utility 
calculations. Moral legitimacy is established based on social normative approval, reflecting stakeholders’ positive 
evaluations of the firm and its activities in terms of social welfare, defined by the audience’s socially constructed value 
system (e.g., Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Suchman, 1995). A firm’s financial performance and business success affect 
pragmatic legitimacy, and its moral legitimacy depends more on the nature of the business. Specifically, stakeholders 
will not value a firm’s CSP much if it does not fulfill its more basic responsibility of meeting the financial needs of its 
stakeholders (pragmatic legitimacy), and they may also discount it if the firm is operating in industries such as alcoholic 
beverages, tobacco, firearms, and gambling (hereafter termed ‘socially contested’ industries) (moral legitimacy). 
This explains why the same amount of investment in CSP may not generate equal returns for different firms 
(Barnett, 2007; Barnett and Salomon, 2012; Rowley and Berman, 2000). With a few notable exceptions (e.g., Barnett and 
Salomon, 2006, 2012; Hull and Rothenberg, 2008; Wang and Choi, 2013), previous research has largely overlooked the 
contingency factors that cause variability in the CSP-CFP relationship. Understanding the underlying drivers of whether, 
how, and when particular firms may earn positive financial returns from CSP is critical and this subject deserves further 
examination in order to aid managerial resource allocation decisions (Barnett, 2007). 
Empirically, we test these ideas using a data set of about 3,000 U.S. publicly listed firms over a 17-year period, from 
1991 to 2007. For our empirical model, rather than using an ad hoc model of firm valuation, we adopt the residual 
income model that is deeply rooted in scholarly work in economics, finance, and accounting (e.g., Edwards and 
Bell, 1961; Ohlson, 1995; Peasnell, 1982; Preinreich, 1938). The residual income model provides a strong theoretical 
basis and motivation for the empirical model specifications. Despite its sophisticated derivation, the model is 
parsimonious in that it incorporates fundamental firm financial information and additional firm characteristics with ease. 
That formulation allows us to better evaluate the economic value of CSP. 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
CSP as an insurance mechanism 
Stakeholder theory highlights the importance of a firm’s relationships with a broad set of stakeholders (Freeman, 1984). 
Most previous research that has examined the relationship between CSP and CFP has often implicitly assumed that the 
value of CSP lies in certain incremental efficiency gains it facilitates. Along these lines, it has been argued that 
outstanding CSP enhances the corporate reputation (Fombrun, 1996), generates greater consumer support (Lev, Petrovits, 
and Radhakrishnan, 2010; Luo and Bhattacharya, 2006; Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001), deepens employee commitment 
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(Greening and Turban, 2000), promotes legitimacy in the community (Fombrun et al., 2000), and develops better 
governmental relationships (Campbell, 2007; Wang and Qian, 2011). Compared to these efficiency enhancement 
mechanisms, the risk management function of CSP is less discussed and has few empirical investigations (Peloza, 2006). 
From a risk management perspective, CSP could serve as a buffer against loss and, thus, safeguard a firm’s assets 
(Fombrun et al., 2000). Good corporate social practices have been proposed as an essential element of corporate risk 
management to the extent that they help identify emerging problems, prevent fraud, preserve the corporate reputation, 
and minimize any penalties when transgressions occur (Francis and Armstrong, 2003). Moral capital generated through 
superior CSP can protect relational assets against loss by moderating stakeholders’ negative assessments 
(Godfrey, 2005). When facing accusations, firms with good CSP records can draw on the reservoirs of goodwill 
accumulated through their social initiatives. For example, being associated with a well-regarded firm may discourage 
employees from rogue behavior. Showing concern for customers and conveying favorable messages may reduce the 
threat of negative reactions from investors and analysts. The community, the media, partner firms, and even social 
activists may be more tolerant of a firm with a reputation for good CSP (Fombrun et al., 2000). 
Consistent with these arguments, Bansal and Clelland (2004) have noted that in the event of a crisis, the moral capital 
accumulated through CSP can help decouple any illegitimate activity from the rest of the organization. Klein and Dawar 
(2004) have shown that CSP affects consumers’ attributions of blame when there is a product crisis. They conclude that 
CSP may be able to mitigate negative brand evaluations. In a study of the influence of corporate philanthropy and 
corporate crime on firm reputation, Williams and Barrett (2000) find that a firm’s reputation can be diminished by 
regulatory violations, but the decline in reputation is significantly less for a firm known for corporate philanthropy. More 
recently, Godfrey has led a study of 178 negative legal/regulatory actions against firms during the 1993 to 2003 period, 
which found that such events do, in general, reduce firm value, but that the decline is smaller for firms that actively 
engage in activities generally considered socially responsible, especially those targeted at secondary stakeholders (such 
as the community in general) (Godfrey et al., 2009). 
Corporate social activities can also help protect firms against negative events whose causes are purely external. 
Blacconiere and Patten (1994) study the market’s reaction to firms in the chemical industry in response to a chemical 
leak at Union Carbide. They found that firms that had made more extensive environmental disclosures in their financial 
reports prior to the leak experienced less negative reactions than firms with less extensive disclosures. Schnietz and 
Epstein (2005) have shown that a reputation for social responsibility helped protect a firm’s stock price in the general 
decline associated with the collapse of World Trade Organization talks in Seattle in 1999. 
So prior scholarly work has shown that CSP can be effective as an insurance mechanism, but the fact that positive moral 
capital can provide insurance-like protection does not imply that corporate social activities can positively contribute to 
firm value ex ante. When a firm buys fire insurance, the amount of the insurance payout when fire damage has occurred 
depends on the causes and nature of the fire, and this will determine ex post the value of having taken out the insurance. 
In contrast, the ex ante view seeks to determine whether the same fire insurance is valuable when no fire damage has yet 
occurred. The ex ante value of fire insurance depends on estimates of the likelihood of fire damage occurring, the 
probable extent and nature of the damage, the firm’s likely role in any fire, and the cost of the policy.2 As such, the 
effectiveness of the insurance (the ex post view) is clearly distinct from the value of holding it (the ex ante view). The ex 
ante insurance value of CSP also can differ from firm to firm. As insurance, CSP presumably creates more value for 
firms at greater risk. 
Litigation risk and the ex ante insurance value of CSP 
The insurance value of a firm’s CSP is determined by the extent to which the firm needs such insurance, so it increases 
with a firm’s risk exposure. In today’s litigious business environment, firms face increased litigation risks. For listed 
American firms, even a sudden or substantial stock price drop can precipitate shareholder lawsuits (Alexander, 1991; 
Lowry and Shu, 2002; Tucker, 1991). An error in financial statements, a failure to disclose material information, or even 
a substantial adjustment in asset carrying values, all could potentially trigger a lawsuit (Francis, Philbrick, and 
Schipper, 1994). 
                                                          
2
  While the fire insurance analogy is useful to illustrate the distinctions between ex ante and ex post perspectives of CSP insurance 
value, the insurance properties of CSP differ from traditional insurance policies (such as fire insurance) in several manners. While an 
active market is commonly available for traditional insurance policies, no such market exists for firms to trade on the insurance aspects 
of CSP. This is because, unlike traditional insurance policies, CSP as insurance is not contractible: the insurance properties of CSP rest 
on stakeholder goodwill rather than explicit contracts. Consequently, the timing, costs, and benefits of the insurance properties of CSP 
cannot be established in the same ways as traditional insurance policies. Similarly, unlike traditional insurance policies, the insurance 
properties of CSP cannot be enforced in the court of law. 
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The potential costs involved in a lawsuit (legal fees, time allocated to the lawsuit, the opportunity costs of executives 
distracted from their main operational tasks, reputation costs, settlement costs) are usually substantial. Lowry and Shu 
(2002) studied lawsuits related to the underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) in the U.S. and found that the 
settlement payments, one of the most publicized costs of litigation, averaged $3.3 million and represented 11 percent of 
the total proceeds raised. Firms making IPOs and their underwriters often intentionally underprice the issue to decrease 
the probability of litigation as well as any damages in the event of a suit (Lowry and Shu, 2002). Focusing on 827 class 
actions settled from 1996 to 2006, Simmons and Ryan (2007) showed that the average (inflation adjusted) settlement 
increased over time—in 1996 to 1999 it was $16.3 million, but by 2006 it had increased significantly to $180.7 million. 
Even after excluding settlements of more than $1 billion, the average settlement amount in 2006 was still at an all-time 
high of $45 million (cf. 1996 to 2005 average of $22.6 million). The total costs of litigation to firms involved are, of 
course, much higher than these direct settlement payments. 
Just as IPO underpricing may be an effective insurance mechanism in certain circumstances, in a more general setting, 
moral capital accumulated through corporate social practices may also represent a form of insurance against losses from 
future litigation. One element of total litigation cost is any punishment received from stakeholders. That amount is likely 
to be influenced by the attributions those stakeholders hold with respect to the firm (Godfrey, 2005). It seems reasonable 
that stakeholders should be more willing to give the benefit of the doubt to a firm that actively engages in corporate 
social activities, and this should reduce the severity of their sanctions. They may even forgive unscrupulous acts to a 
certain extent (Godfrey et al., 2009). As such, the costs of CSP can be conceived as an investment in insurance against 
litigation, and given the high litigation costs involved, such insurance may be very valuable to a firm. 
Industries vary widely in terms of the level of litigation risk their firms face. The clustering of litigation among certain 
industries has been widely documented (e.g., Cornerstone Research, 2011; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 1999; Rogers and 
Van Buskirk, 2009). Firms in high-tech industries tend to face higher litigation risks because they derive more of their 
value from growth options than from tangible assets. And indeed, firms in high-tech industries have been found to suffer 
a disproportionately large amount of litigation relative to other industries (e.g., Field, Lowry, and Shu, 2005; Johnson, 
Kasznik, and Nelson, 2001; Johnson, Nelson, and Pritchard, 2007). Firms in industries with high litigation risks should 
be more likely to benefit from CSP as an ex ante defense strategy. 
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, the positive relationship between CSP and firm value is stronger for firms in industries 
with higher levels of litigation risk. 
Organizational legitimacy and the legitimacy of CSP 
So far this discussion has relied on the argument that a firm obtains moral capital (a source of insurance value) by 
engaging in CSP and that the value of this moral capital varies with the level of risk, for example litigation risk, against 
which it might need to insure itself. However, in order for CSP to generate moral capital at all, the firm must meet certain 
basic conditions by passing some legitimacy tests. Both pragmatic and moral legitimacy may affect stakeholders’ 
evaluations of the motives behind a firm’s prosocial activities (e.g., Suchman, 1995). The extent to which a firm’s CSP is 
valuable will depend on whether it has pragmatic and moral legitimacy in the eyes of its stakeholders. Pragmatic 
legitimacy is interpreted in this study in terms of a firm’s financial position. Moral legitimacy, however, is thought to be 
influenced by whether or not a firm operates in a socially contested industry.3 
Pragmatic legitimacy and financial distress risk 
Pragmatic legitimacy is based on self-interest and reflects the utility calculations of a firm’s stakeholders 
(Suchman, 1995). A firm’s financial position is, thus, expected to affect its pragmatic legitimacy. Firms in strong 
financial positions are in a better position to have pragmatic legitimacy, since such legitimacy is typically obtained by 
directing tangible rewards to their stakeholders, including granting their employees better compensation, providing their 
shareholders higher dividends, and delivering better value to their customers (Suchman,1995). Academic research has 
confirmed the general wisdom that a firm’s long-run survival and profitability depend on its ability to satisfy the needs of 
its various stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995). Firms can maximize their effectiveness only when the fundamental needs of 
their stakeholders are met (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). 
Financially distressed firms can less easily maintain pragmatic legitimacy in the eyes of their stakeholders. Here, 
‘financial distress’ refers to a low cash flow state in which a firm incurs losses without being insolvent 
                                                          
3
   Firms in highly litigious industries do not necessarily operate in socially contested industries. The clustering of high and low 
litigation risk industries is not based on whether firms in those industries face more or less moral hazard, rather, the classification is 
based on the industries’ litigation history. 
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(Purnanandam, 2008). Financially distressed firms send strong signals of the failure of their current strategies. 
Stakeholders have expectations about firms in financial distress that are different from those they apply to firms that are 
solvent. Stakeholders expect profitable firms to contribute more to society and reward those that do so, but they expect a 
firm that performs poorly to apply its limited resources to improving business operations instead of diverting them to 
various types of social activities. Thus, if a poorly performing firm actively engages in prosocial activities, such behavior 
may even attract punishment instead of rewards from its stakeholders (Wang and Qian, 2011). 
Moreover, a financially distressed firm may have already lost customers, valuable suppliers, and key employees because 
they are concerned about its long-term survival. Customers may be reluctant to do business with distressed firms (Opler 
and Titman, 1994). When Apple Inc. had financial difficulties in the mid-1990s, software developers were reluctant to 
develop new application software for Macintosh computers which, in part, caused a 27 percent decline in unit sales 
(Purnanandam, 2008). As a firm’s stakeholder base contracts when the firm is in financial distress, the audience for its 
prosocial activities and, thus, the moral capital it can potentially gain, will be constrained. 
Indeed, a firm in financial distress may not be able to provide consistent service or product quality to its customers, job 
security to its employees, or dividends to its shareholders (Schnietz and Epstein, 2005). This can eventually affect the 
self-interested calculations of its audiences and decrease its pragmatic legitimacy in the eyes of its stakeholders 
(Suchman, 1995). In such circumstances, engaging in prosocial activities obviously conflicts with a firm’s more salient 
responsibilities, such as bottom line performance and solvency. Spending resources on socially responsible causes will be 
unlikely to generate much moral capital in such circumstances or provide compelling evidence of prudent stewardship in 
the eyes of stakeholders. With little pragmatic legitimacy, firms in financial distress are less likely to benefit from CSP. 
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, the positive relationship between CSP and firm value is weaker for firms at greater risk of 
financial distress. 
Moral legitimacy and whether or not a firm operates in a socially contested industry 
Moral legitimacy is based on normative approval and reflects stakeholders’ evaluations of a firm’s activities in terms of 
whether it is sincerely trying to improve overall social welfare (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Suchman, 1995). Moral 
legitimacy rests on stakeholders’ judgments about whether a given activity is ‘the right thing to do.’ Godfrey (2005) has 
also noted that whether corporate social activities can generate moral capital depends heavily on the stakeholders’ 
evaluations of the firm’s motives. If socially responsible activities are viewed as a genuine manifestation of the firm’s 
intentions and can improve overall social welfare, there will be greater moral capital generated. If, however, the socially 
responsible activities are viewed as an ingratiating attempt to win favor, the firm is less likely to gain and may even 
generate a negative moral evaluation (Godfrey, 2005). 
In the context of this article, we consider that for firms operating in socially contested industries such as alcoholic 
beverage, tobacco, firearms, and gambling, their CSP activities are more likely to be perceived by stakeholders as lacking 
a moral basis. It is hard to convince most stakeholders that operating in those socially contested industries is ‘the right 
thing to do.’ Any socially responsible activities conducted by firms in those industries may be perceived as ‘blood 
money’ to either atone for past sins or to compensate for current practices that are negatively regarded. Godfrey cites 
tobacco companies that try to offset their negative product image through generous philanthropy (Godfrey et al., 2009) 
and suggests that stakeholders may view CSP engagement by such firms as hypocritical, making it more difficult to 
convince them that the firm sincerely cares about social welfare. Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) have shown that 
environmental awards result in significant share price increases and that those increases are larger for firms in historically 
‘clean’ industries than for those in socially contested industries. The pursuit of CSP by firms in socially contested 
industries may be less likely to build moral legitimacy, so CSP is less likely to generate value for those firms. 
Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, the positive relationship between CSP and firm value is weaker for firms operating in 
socially contested industries. 
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METHODS 
 
Data and sample 
Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini & Co., Inc. (KLD) and Compustat were the two major data sources for this study. Data from 
KLD were used to quantify a firm’s CSP. While far from perfect, KLD data are widely used in business and social 
research and are considered to be the best available for compiling a comprehensive measure of CSP (e.g., Barnett and 
Salomon, 2012; Choi and Wang, 2009; Graves and Waddock,1994; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Waddock and 
Graves, 1997). Information on firms’ CSP was analyzed for the 17-year period from 1991 to 2007. It was then merged 
with Compustat data on financial performance and other firm-level variables. After merging the data, a final sample of 
3,029 firms and 15,504 firm-year observations was available to test the hypotheses. 
Variable definitions and measures 
The dependent variable, firm value, was measured as price of the firm’s equity. Following the methods pioneered by 
Choi and Wang (2009) and Hillman and Keim (2001), an aggregate measure of CSP was designed to incorporate the 
community relations, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product dimensions of the KLD data. Each 
dimension was standardized to make the scores directly comparable across dimensions and over time (Mattingly and 
Berman, 2006). The KLD index evaluates each of the five dimensions in terms of ‘strengths’ and ‘concerns.’ The 
weaknesses were subtracted from the strengths to arrive at a net score for each dimension. 
Following the lead of prior studies (e.g., Ali and Kallapur, 2001; Francis et al., 1994; Matsumoto, 2002) SIC codes 
2833–2836 (biotechnology), 3570–3577 and 7370–7374 (computers), 3600–3674 (electronics), and 5200–5961 
(retailing) were selected as representing industries characterized by a high level of litigation risk. Prior studies have 
identified these industries as high risk based on their actual incidences of securities litigation. High litigation risk took a 
value of ‘1’ if a firm’s primary industry belonged to one of those industries and ‘0’ otherwise. 
Pragmatic legitimacy and moral legitimacy were quantified using a firm’s financial condition and its membership in a 
socially contested industry, respectively. Altman’s Z-score was used to measure the likelihood of a firm experiencing 
financial distress or bankruptcy (Miller and Reuer, 1996). It measures the probability of bankruptcy within the next two 
years, where a higher Z-score means better financial health. A firm was classified as having a high distress risk if its Z-
score was lower than 2.7 (or 3.0).4 High distress risk took a value of ‘1’ for such firms and ‘0’ otherwise. Socially 
contested industry was a dummy variable created to indicate firms in the alcoholic beverage, firearms, defense, gambling, 
forestry, mining, or tobacco industries. Such firms were coded ‘1’ with all others coded ‘0’. 
Firm valuation model 
We adopt the residual income model to examine the ex ante CSP value. The conceptual foundation of the residual 
income model is that firms create wealth by generating earnings in excess of their cost of capital. It has a long tradition 
(see Edwards and Bell, 1961; Ohlson,1995; Peasnell, 1982; Preinreich, 1938).5 The residual income model provides 
theoretical foundations that incorporate both firm fundamental and non-fundamental information in the value function. 
So, in stark contrast to previous scholarly work on the relationship between CSP and CFP, it provides a conceptual 
motivation to incorporate CSP into the valuation function and assess its valuation effects in a more structured 
manner.6 We describe the basic intuitions underlying the residual income model below, as it is relatively new to the 
management literature. 
The residual income model rests on three assumptions (Ohlson, 1995). The first is that a firm’s value (the price of its 
equity) is equal to the present value of expected dividends: 
                                                          
4
  A Z-score below 2.7 indicates there is a good chance that the firm will be in distress within the next two years, while a Z-score 
between 2.7 and 3.0 indicates a firm is on alert. 
5
  Biddle, Bowen, and Wallace (1997) trace the residual income model’s conceptual foundations as far back as Hamilton (1777) and 
Marshall (1890). 
6
  For ease of subsequent expositions and clarity, hereafter we replace b with BVE to represent book value of equity, and we replace 
x with EARN to represent earnings. 
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      (1) 
where Pt is the firm’s share price at time t, dt is net dividend paid at time t, r is the discount rate, and Et[.] is the expected 
value operator, conditional on the information available at time t. 
The second assumption is the clean surplus accounting relation: 
      (2) 
where bt is the book value of equity at time t, and xt is earnings for the period t-1 to t. Substituting the clean surplus 
accounting relation, Equation (2), into the discounted dividend model yields 
    (3) 
Rewriting Equation (3) after some algebraic manipulations yields 
 (4) 
As τ → ∞, the final term in Equation (4) becomes zero. The ‘residual income’ or ‘abnormal earnings’ is then defined 
as . That is, residual income represents earnings minus a capital charge for the invested capital. 
The share price can then be expressed as the sum of book value and the present value of future residual income: 
     (5) 
The third assumption specifies that residual income has the following information dynamics: 
     (6a) 
      (6b) 
where vt is information on future residual income not in current residual income. The disturbance terms, εi,t, are 
unpredictable and have zero mean. ω and γ are fixed persistence parameters that fall between zero and one. 
Combining Equations (5), (6a), and (7) yields the following valuation function: 
     (7) 
where α1 = ω/(1 + r−ω) and α2 = (1+r)/[(1 + r − ω)(1 + r − γ)]. Expressing Equation (7) in terms of earnings and book 
value of equity rather than residual income, 
   (8) 
where k = r.ω, ranging between zero and one, and φ = (1 − r)/r. 
The information dynamics underlying the residual income model provide a conceptual foundation critical to 
incorporating CSP in firm valuation. If CSP, vt, creates value for the firm, it should increase the firm’s future residual 
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income, , as described in Equations (6a)and (6b). This should increase the firm’s current share price, Pt. Thus, the 
residual income model allows examining the financial market’s ex ante valuation of a firm’s CSP, incremental to 
fundamental accounting information. Note that when only fundamental accounting information is considered, the final 
term in Equation (8), α2vt, drops out of the model. 
Following the lead of many prior studies, empirically, the value of a firm’s equity value can be expressed as a function of 
its fundamentals (book value of equity, BVE, and earnings, EARN)7 and other information that are not already in current 
residual income, 
   (9) 
One elegant feature of the residual income valuation model is that it is deceptively simple. Book value of equity and 
earnings (BVEt andEARNt) are two summary measures of a firm’s entire financial situation. That means there will be no 
omitted variable problem relating to financial information,8 so there is no need to separately control for variables such as 
research and development (R&D) expenditure, advertising, or other expenses already incorporated in EARNt.9 In 
addition, given that the main variables (Pt, BVEt, and EARNt) are expressed on a per share basis, firm size is normalized 
in the model. The leverage effects on firm valuation are captured by the discount rate, r, which is embedded within the 
coefficients β1, β2, and a2. Similarly, β2 embeds the price-to-earnings characteristics that reflect investors’ assessments of 
the firm’s growth opportunities, so there is little need to separately control for firm growth. Any other characteristics 
developed over the firm’s life cycle that affect its ability to create wealth, hence, residual income, are also directly 
modeled without having to explicitly specify and empirically proxy for them. This makes the residual income model a 
rich, theoretically sound, yet highly parsimonious, representation of firm value. The formulation can be implemented 
with a minimum of modifications (or control variables) to investigate the value of a firm’s CSP. 
To derive the base empirical model, Equation (9) was modified by including a measure of CSP at the end of the prior 
year (CSPit-1), and industry and year dummies were added to control for industry and time-specific differences in market 
valuation that are not already captured by EARN and BVE.10 Specifically, industry dummies control for industry-wide 
factors that can affect firm value, while year dummies control for economy-wide factors. Formally, 
  (10) 
where Pit is the equity value (per share) of firm i at the end of fiscal year t, BVEit is the book value of its equity (per 
share), and EARNit is its earnings per share. 
Equation (10) was estimated separately for groups of firms high or low in terms of litigation risk, distress risk, and 
association with a socially contested industry. The advantage of this approach is that it allows the independent variables 
to have differential influence on firm value in the high and low groups. Compared to an interaction approach, this 
subgroup analysis allowed fundamental information (BVEand EARN) and other information (CSP, industry, and year 
                                                          
7
 For ease of subsequent expositions and clarity, hereafter we replace b with BVE to represent book value of equity, and we replace 
x with EARN to represent earnings. 
8
  To the extent that a researcher is interested in a specific financial characteristic and its effect on firm valuation, he/she would simply 
include the financial characteristic separately in Equation 9 and exclude it from either BVE or EARN, depending on whether the 
financial characteristic is a balance sheet or income statement item. For example, if a researcher is interested in the specific effects of 
R&D on firm valuation, he/she can exclude R&D from EARN and include R&D spending separately in the valuation function. In this 
study, we are not interested in how specific financial characteristics influence firm value and, hence, we did not need to decompose the 
two summary measures (BVE and EARN) into their finer components. 
9
 We acknowledge that previous research typically controls for a firm’s investment in R&D and advertising intensity while examining 
the relationship between CSP and CFP (McWilliams and Siegel, 2000). Including these controls was appropriate in those studies 
because their model specifications differed both conceptually and empirically from the residual income model adopted here. However, 
as a robustness check, additional analyses were conducted controlling for those factors. Consistent with the conceptual foundations of 
the residual income model, the evidence remained consistent with the main results. Please refer to the section on sensitivity testing for 
details. 
10
 We adopted the Fama-French 49 industry classification commonly used in accounting and finance for our industry controls. This 
scheme is based on four-digit SIC codes. A full list of the classification can be accessed on Kenneth French’s Web site 
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/det_49_ind_port.html). 
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fixed effects) to influence firm value differently in firms high and low in litigation risk and distress risk and involved or 
not involved in a socially contested industry.11 
An important aspect of this research design is that it assumes CSP can influence firm value via multiple channels (e.g., 
insurance/risk management and reputation enhancement, among others). The coefficients estimated for Equation (10) for 
the high and low risk groups represent the total effects of CSP on firm value for each group, irrespective of the 
underlying mechanisms. In order to tease out the insurance effects, the analysis focused on whether CSP predicts firm 
value differently in the high and low risk groups and in the manner predicted by the hypotheses. 
Two complementary empirical analyses were applied in the testing. In both, Equation (10) was estimated separately for 
each group. The predicted change in firm value was then calculated based on a one standard deviation change in 
the CSP variable and expressed as a percentage of the mean (or median) share price for the relevant group. The 
significance of any firm value difference between the groups was then tested statistically. These were termed the 
‘economic effect tests.’ The second analysis tested whether the estimated coefficients were significantly different 
between the two groups of firms. These were the ‘coefficient tests.’ 
The economic effect tests were intended to provide evidence of the economic significance of the value of CSP, as well as 
evidence of whether its economic effects are significantly different among groups in a manner consistent with the study’s 
predictions. The coefficient tests provided evidence about whether or not CSP enhances firm value and whether the value 
generation differs among groups as predicted. Thus, the two approaches complement one another and allow conclusions 
about both the economic and statistical significance of any differences. 
 
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix are presented in Table 1. Consistent with the valuation model, a firm’s 
equity book value (BVE) and earnings per share (EARN) were highly correlated with a firm’s equity value (P), as would 
be expected. In general, there was a significant positive correlation between a firm’s equity value and its CSP, providing 
preliminary evidence that CSP enhances firm value. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
Variables Mean S.D. Pt BVEt EARNt 
High 
litigation 
riskt 
Z-scoret 
Socially  
contested  
industryt 
Pt 31.62 21.17             
BVEt 11.93 9.06 0.59***           
EARNt 1.25 1.84 0.66*** 0.55***         
High litigation riskt 0.35 0.48 −0.14*** −0.24*** −0.19***       
Z-scoret 14.90 57.79 0.10*** 0.02* 0.07*** −0.03***     
Socially contested 
industryt 0.02 0.15 0.05
***
 0.00 0.04*** −0.11*** −0.01   
CSPt-1 −0.01 2.60 0.02** −0.12*** −0.03*** 0.13*** 0.04*** −0.03*** 
N = 15,504; ***indicates significance at the p ≤ 0.001 (**p ≤ 0.01, *p ≤ 0.05) level of confidence. 
 
                                                          
11
 The estimated effects of the independent variables were indeed different in the high and low litigation risk and distress risk groups 
and between firms operating in socially contested industries and the rest. This confirms the appropriateness of the design choice. 
However, as a robustness check, an interaction term approach was also applied to test the propositions, yielding qualitatively 
consistent evidence and conclusions. Please refer to the sensitivity tests section for details. 
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Table 2 reports the coefficients of the baseline model estimating the impact of CSP on firm value. In Model 1, both the 
equity book value and earnings per share showed positive and significant relationships with equity value, consistent with 
the theoretical predictions. In Model 2, the coefficient of CSP was positive and significant at the 0.1 percent level, 
suggesting that investment in social activities enhances firm value. In terms of economic significance, a one standard 
deviation increase in CSP is associated with a 5.08 percent (5.94%) increase in mean (median) equity value. 
 
Table 2. Base model of the impact of CSP on firm value 
Variables (1) Base (2) CSP 
BVEt 0.806*** 0.827*** 
  (0.016) (0.016) 
EARNt 5.572*** 5.508*** 
  (0.076) (0.076) 
CSPt-1   0.618*** 
    (0.046) 
Constant 13.502*** 13.197*** 
  (2.889) (2.873) 
Year dummies Y Y 
Industry dummies Y Y 
Observations 15,504 15,504 
Adjusted R-squared 0.557 0.562 
Valuation effects#:     
Mean   5.08% 
Median   5.94% 
Standard errors in parentheses 
***
 indicates significance at the p ≤ 0.001 level of confidence (two tailed). 
# Valuation effects are calculated based on a one standard deviation change in 
CSP as a percentage of the mean or median share price of the relevant group. 
 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that the positive relationship between CSP and firm value is stronger for firms in highly litigious 
industries. Table 3reports the results from the modeling based on industry litigation risk. Models 2 and 4 show that CSP 
had a positive and significant relationship with firm value, but the magnitude of the effect varies. Specifically, the 
estimated coefficient of the CSP for firms in high litigation industries is significantly greater than that for firms in low 
litigation industries. In terms of economic importance, among firms in high litigation industries, a one standard deviation 
increase in CSP is associated with an increase of 6.78 percent (8.31%) in mean (median) firm value. In contrast, a one 
standard deviation increase is associated with an increase of only 3.95 percent (4.55%) in mean (median) firm value 
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among firms in low litigation industries. These differences in CSP valuation are statistically significant at the 0.1 percent 
level. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is supported. 
 
Table 3. The impact of CSP on firm value: partitioned by industry litigation risk 
Variables 
High litigation risk Low litigation risk 
(1) Base (2) CSP (3) Base (4) CSP 
BVEt 0.934*** 0.936*** 0.785*** 0.806*** 
  (0.033) (0.033) (0.018) (0.018) 
EARNt 6.171*** 6.102*** 5.308*** 5.252*** 
  (0.146) (0.145) (0.088) (0.088) 
CSPt-1   0.754***   0.508*** 
    (0.078)   (0.056) 
Constant 9.305** 8.337** 14.728*** 14.459*** 
  (3.112) (3.087) (3.328) (3.314) 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y 
Observations 5,375 5,375 10,129 10,129 
Adjusted R-squared 0.544 0.552 0.567 0.570 
Valuation effects#:         
Mean   6.78%   3.95% 
Median   8.31%   4.55% 
Tests of differences: Economic effect tests Coefficient test   
  Mean Median CSP coefficient   
High less low 2.83%a 3.77%a 0.246*   
Standard errors in parentheses 
***  indicates significance at the p ≤ 0.001 (** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05) level of confidence (two tailed). 
#  Valuation effects are calculated based on a one standard deviation change in CSP as a percentage 
of the mean or median share price of the relevant group. 
 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that firms are less likely to benefit from CSP if they lack pragmatic legitimacy, that is, if they are 
in financial distress. Tables 4, 5 provide the results partitioned by distress scores at the 2.7 and 3.0 levels, respectively. In 
Panel A, using an Altman’s Z-score of 2.7 as the cutoff point, the coefficient of the CSP for non-distressed firms was 
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larger than that for distressed firms, and the difference was statistically significant at the 0.1 percent level. Similar results 
are shown in Panel B using a 3.0 Z-score as the cutoff point. The test of differences was also significant at the 0.1 percent 
level. In terms of economic significance, a one standard deviation increase in CSP increases the mean (median) equity 
value of non-distressed firms by about 2.3 percent (2.5%) more than for distressed firms. Both differences are statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level or better, supporting Hypothesis 2. 
Table 4. The impact of CSP on firm value: partitioned by distress score (Altman Z-score) using 2.7 as the cutoff 
Variables 
Financially distressed Financially non-distressed 
(1) Base (2) CSP (3) Base (4) CSP 
BVEt 1.055*** 1.060*** 0.660*** 0.686*** 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) 
EARNt 2.870*** 2.858*** 7.240*** 7.173*** 
  (0.099) (0.099) (0.113) (0.112) 
CSPt-1   0.288***   0.692*** 
    (0.072)   (0.056) 
Constant −0.048 −1.415 12.914*** 12.936*** 
  (7.253) (7.249) (3.096) (3.075) 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y 
Observations 4,495 4,495 11,009 11,009 
Adjusted R-squared 0.650 0.651 0.554 0.560 
Valuation effectsa:         
Mean   2.90%   5.22% 
Median   3.57%   6.08% 
Tests of differences: Economic effect tests Coefficient test   
  Mean Median CSP coefficient   
Distress less non-distress −2.32%** −2.50%** −0.404***   
Standard errors in parentheses;  *** indicates significance at the p ≤ 0.001 (**p ≤ 0.01) level of confidence (two tailed). 
A score below 2.7 indicates that there is a good chance the firm will be in distress within the next two years. 
# Valuation effects are calculated based on a one standard deviation change in CSP as a percentage of the mean or median 
share price of the relevant group. 
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Table 5. The impact of CSP on firm value: partitioned by distress score (Altman Z-score) using 3.0 as the cutoff 
Variables 
Financially distressed Financially non-distressed 
(1) Base (2) CSP (3) Base (4) CSP 
BVEt 1.040*** 1.047*** 0.669*** 0.694*** 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.024) 
EARNt 3.133*** 3.120*** 7.387*** 7.316*** 
  (0.095) (0.095) (0.119) (0.118) 
CSPt-1   0.304***   0.708*** 
    (0.066)   (0.058) 
Constant −0.146 −1.418 13.111*** 13.253*** 
  (6.373) (6.367) (3.169) (3.146) 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y 
Observations 5,276 5,276 10,228 10,228 
Adjusted R-squared 0.650 0.651 0.553 0.559 
Valuation effects#:         
Mean   2.99%   5.27% 
Median   3.63%   6.12% 
Tests of differences: Economic effect tests Coefficient test   
  Mean Median CSP Coefficient   
Distress less non-
distress −2.28%
***
 −2.49%*** −0.405***   
Standard errors in parentheses;  *** indicates significance at the p ≤ 0.001  
A score between 3.0 and 2.7 indicates a firm on alert, and below 2.7 indicates there is a good chance that the 
firm will be in distress within the next two years. 
# Valuation effects are calculated based on a one standard deviation change in CSP as a percentage of the mean 
or median share price of the relevant group. 
 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that firms are less likely to benefit from CSP if they lack moral legitimacy. That is, firms in 
socially contested industries are less likely than others to benefit from CSP. Table 6 reports the results from modeling 
partitioned by socially contested industry. CSP showed a significant positive effect for firms not operating in socially 
contested industries, but no statistically significant effect for firms operating in socially contested ones. Both the 
economic effects and the coefficients of the CSP were significantly larger for firms not involved in socially contested 
industries, consistent with Hypothesis 3. 
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Table 6. The impact of CSP on firm value: partitioned by industry social contestability 
Variables 
Contested industries Non-contested industries 
(1) Base (2) CSP (3) Base (4) CSP 
BVEt 0.502*** 0.479*** 0.821*** 0.842*** 
  (0.099) (0.101) (0.016) (0.016) 
EARNt 6.692*** 6.704*** 5.518*** 5.449*** 
  (0.518) (0.518) (0.077) (0.076) 
CSPt-1   −0.603   0.640*** 
    (0.420)   (0.046) 
Constant 5.437 3.291 13.332a 12.984*** 
  (18.089) (19.514) (2.877) (2.859) 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y 
Observations 381 381 15,123 15,123 
Adjusted R-squared 0.579 0.580 0.557 0.563 
Valuation effects#:         
Mean   −3.88%   5.29% 
Median   −4.22%   6.18% 
Tests of differences^: Economic effect tests Coefficient test   
  Mean Median CSP Coefficient   
Irresponsible less non-
irresponsible −9.17%*** −10.40%*** −1.243***   
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** indicates significance at the p ≤ 0.001 level of confidence (two tailed). 
# Valuation effects are calculated based on one standard deviation change in CSP as a percentage of the mean or median 
share price of the relevant group. 
^Since the CSP coefficient for socially contested industries was not significant, to be more conservative, the statistical 
tests of differences are based on CSP’s economic effects and the coefficients of socially non-contested industries versus 
zero, rather than against the negative economic effects and coefficients of socially contested industries. 
 
Sensitivity tests 
Supplementary analyses were performed to test the robustness of the main results. To facilitate comparison with the 
results of prior CSP studies, a hierarchical regression analysis was first performed by including CSP, industry litigation 
risk, distress risk, and the socially contested industry dummy in the same model. Rather than dummy coded measures, 
continuous measures of distress risk were used. The results are presented in Table 7. Corporate social performance 
showed a consistently significant and positive relationship with firm value. Also, as shown in Model 7, the interaction 
effects between CSP, litigation risk, distress risk, and a socially contested industry were consistent with the main 
findings. 
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Table 7. Hierarchical regression analysis of CSP on firm value 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
BVEt 0.806*** 0.827*** 0.833*** 0.830*** 0.833*** 0.832*** 0.829*** 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
EARNt 5.572*** 5.508*** 5.452*** 5.455*** 5.453*** 5.450*** 5.453*** 
  (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) 
CSPt-1   0.618*** 0.604*** 0.509*** 0.583*** 0.627*** 0.512*** 
    (0.046) (0.046) (0.057) (0.047) (0.046) (0.059) 
High litigationt     0.396 0.245 0.416 0.387 0.267 
      (0.478) (0.481) (0.478) (0.478) (0.480) 
Socially contested industryt     5.678** 5.725** 5.616** 5.496** 5.488** 
      (1.808) (1.807) (1.808) (1.808) (1.807) 
Distress riskt     −0.019*** −0.019*** −0.018*** −0.019*** −0.018*** 
      (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
High litigationt * CSPt-1       0.278**     0.262** 
        (0.096)     (0.097) 
Distress riskt * CSPt-1         −0.001+   −0.001* 
          (0.001)   (0.001) 
Socially contested 
industryt * CSPt-1           −1.320
***
 −1.221*** 
            (0.348) (0.349) 
Constant 13.502*** 13.197*** 12.157*** 12.100*** 12.264*** 12.095*** 12.161*** 
  (2.889) (2.873) (2.866) (2.866) (2.867) (2.865) (2.865) 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 15,504 15,504 15,504 15,504 15,504 15,504 15,504 
R-squared 0.559 0.564 0.567 0.567 0.567 0.567 0.567 
F-statistic  
(∆R-squared)   180.7
***
 31.85*** 8.358** 3.836+ 14.41*** 8.457*** 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
*** indicates significance at the p ≤ 0.001 (** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05, + p ≤ 0.10) level of confidence (two tailed). 
Distress risk is measured as the negative of the Z-score such that a larger number indicates greater risk of distress. 
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Another potential concern relates to endogeneity, where CSP might be endogenously determined by various firm factors. 
A two-stage least squares (2SLS) analysis was conducted to address this issue.12 In the first stage, a firm’s lagged share 
price, current ratio, debt ratio, size, R&D intensity, advertising intensity, and age were included along with industry 
average CSP and industry and year dummies to predict a firm’s CSP. Industry average CSP served as the instrumental 
variable (e.g., Ghoul et al., 2011; Wang, Choi, and Li,, 2008).13 In the second stage, the predicted CSP from the first-
stage estimation replaced the CSP variable in Equation (10), and all the main analyses of Tables 3-7 were reestimated. 
The evidence remained consistent with that from the main tests, leading to qualitatively identical conclusions.14 
While our litigation risk measure is a well accepted and commonly used in several disciplines, it remains a crude 
measure. To alleviate concerns that the findings may be compromised by its crudeness, information on securities class 
action suits filed since 1996 (the start of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)) until the end of 
the sample period in 2007 was collected by hand. The high litigation group consistently had more class actions than the 
low litigation group in every year from 1996 to 2007. This suggests that the original measure of litigation risk 
successfully captured its essence of litigation risk. Additional analysis was also conducted using this alternative measure, 
and the results remained consistent with the reported findings and conclusions. 
Another potential concern is that our findings may be driven by high litigation risk industries being more profitable than 
low litigation risk industries. Following the slack resources arguments (e.g., Seifert, Morris, and Bartkus, 2004), high 
litigation risk industries may have better financial performance, which simultaneously leads to a higher CSP. If this were 
the case, the positive moderating effect of litigation risk on the CSP-CFP relationship found might be spurious. In 
addition to specifically incorporating such causality concerns in our research design (discussed earlier), our descriptive 
statistics reported in Table 1 provide additional evidence against this argument. Specifically, high litigation risk 
industries are found to be less profitable (both in terms of accounting, EARN, and market performance measures, P) and 
have higher CSP than low litigation risk firms. Additional analysis further shows that this pattern is also observed for the 
years before, during, and after CSP is measured (i.e., t-1, t, and t+1), all significant at the 0.01 percent level. Thus, the 
slack resource arguments are less likely to explain our findings on the insurance value of CSP. 
Since the environmental dimension of the CSP measure may be specific to some socially contested industries (especially 
forestry and mining), two additional robustness checks were conducted. In the first, the models were reestimated after 
excluding the environmental dimension from the CSP measure. The difference between firms operating in socially 
contested industries and the rest remained significant. In the second test, the forestry and mining firms were excluded 
from the socially contested industries variable and, again, the results remained consistent with the main findings. 
Another test used Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable but, again, the results were largely consistent with what has been 
presented. Firms at greater risk of litigation were still more likely to benefit from the insurance value of CSP, and CSP 
was still less likely to create value for firms without pragmatic legitimacy. 
Further tests explicitly including R&D spending and advertising intensity as control variables (McWilliams and 
Siegel, 2000) again generated evidence consistent with the main conclusions. A final sensitivity test involved correcting 
the standard errors for the panel data which, again, yielded qualitatively consistent conclusions. Overall, the 
supplementary analyses demonstrated the robustness of the results. 
DISCUSSION 
The central purpose of this study was twofold. First, it was designed to advance the risk management perspective in CSP 
research by analyzing the value of CSP as an insurance mechanism from an ex ante perspective. The results show that the 
insurance value indeed varies with the level of risk firms are exposed to—firms facing greater risk stand to benefit more 
                                                          
12
 Since correlated unobserved firm heterogeneity is one of the potential causes of endogeneity, this concern was addressed 
concurrently as well. 
13
 The theoretical justifications of industry average CSP as a valid instrument come from DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) argument 
that organizations tend to become more similar over time by adopting similar organizational practices through institutional 
isomorphism. Following this argument, it is reasonable to expect that the social activities of industry peers influence a focal firm’s 
social behavior. However, it is unlikely that the social activities of other firms in the same industry have a direct impact on the focal 
firm’s subsequent financial performance. We also examined the strength of this instrument using a first-stage F-test (regressing the 
endogenous variable on the instrument only) prior to the 2SLS analysis (Stock, Wright, and Yogo, 2002). The first-stage F-statistic is 
1,644.9, significantly above the critical value of 8.96 proposed by Stock et al. (2002), indicating that industry-level CSP serves as a 
strong instrument in our 2SLS analyses. 
14
 Using the lagged endogenous variable as an alternative instrument also yielded qualitatively consistent evidence. For brevity, the 
two-stage least square results are not reported here, but they are available upon request from the authors. 
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from CSP. The study also examined the limits to value generation through CSP: for a firm to benefit fully from CSP, it 
must have gained pragmatic and moral legitimacy from its stakeholders by being financially sound and not operating in a 
socially contested industry. 
Previous research on CSP has predominantly focused on its value creation role and on how it can improve a firm’s 
financial performance through enhanced reputation, eliciting better customer and employee support, and so on (e.g., 
Fombrun, 1996; Lev et al., 2010; Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001; Wang and Qian, 2011). Its insurance potential has been 
less explored (Fombrun et al., 2000). This work has shown how its insurance potential varies according to the risks to 
which a firm is exposed. Importantly, the present study allows CSP value to arise from multiple channels while teasing 
out the insurance value of CSP. This extends the understanding of CSP’s value protection mechanism in light of all the 
sources of CSP value. 
Previous research has focused on examining the ex post effectiveness of CSP as an insurance mechanism in mitigating 
loss from negative events (Godfrey et al., 2009), but this study has validated a general model that elucidates the 
conditions in which stakeholders are likely to value CSP as an insurance mechanism ex ante. It focused on the perception 
of firm risks before the (negative) event actually takes place. As such, the study takes into account ex ante risk 
assessments regarding CSP investment, which have not sufficiently been previously addressed by strategic management 
scholars (Ruefli, Collins, and Lacugna, 1999). Husted (2005) has emphasized that the ex ante perspective is clearly 
different from the ex post focus—CSP needs to be like an insurance policy that is there when you need it (Klein and 
Dawar, 2004). 
On a broader level, the results of this study contribute to resolving a long-standing debate in CSP research over whether 
or not firms should divert their scarce cash, time, energy, and other resources to improving their CSP and whether 
excelling in social performance hurts or benefits a corporation financially (e.g., Friedman, 1970; Godfrey, 2005; 
Orlitzky et al., 2003; Waddock and Graves, 1997). These results show that, in general, good CSP can generate positive 
firm value, and such value enhancement is not trivial economically. But it brings greater value to financially sound firms, 
firms that do not operate in socially contested industries, and firms that are exposed to higher risks of litigation. 
There has been limited systematic, theoretical analysis of the firm- and industry-level conditions under which firms 
benefit most from their prosocial corporate practices (Barnett, 2007; Rowley and Berman, 2000). Only recently have 
researchers started looking into the factors influencing the CSP and CFP relationship from the perspective of CSP 
directly creating a positive image and reputation (Barnett and Salomon, 2012; Hull and Rothenberg, 2008; Wang and 
Qian, 2011). Although Godfrey and his coauthors (2009) have examined CSP as a risk management mechanism, they 
took the ex post view, examining factors affecting the effectiveness of CSP in mitigating value losses when negative 
events have already occurred. To our knowledge, no previous study has examined the role of CSP as a risk management 
mechanism from an ex ante perspective. This enquiry has shown that the ex ante insurance value of CSP should depend 
on a firm’s risk exposure. Firms benefit more from the insurance value of good CSP if they are more likely to use the 
‘insurance’ in the future. This works well for firms that operate in industries with high litigation risk, where the 
probability that they will be sued is higher than in other industries. 
For firms to benefit from CSP, it is necessary for them to gain stakeholders’ support by achieving pragmatic legitimacy 
and moral legitimacy. Firms need to satisfy stakeholders’ basic needs and gain practical legitimacy with those 
stakeholders beforehand (Clarkson,1995; Wang and Qian, 2011). The positive relationship between CSP and CFP is 
moderated by a firm’s financial distress risk such that a firm is more likely to benefit from CSP when it is not in financial 
distress. Stakeholders’ support comes only after the firm has provided them hope of a viable future. In addition, for firms 
operating in socially contested industries, their CSP practices are more likely to be viewed by stakeholders as lacking a 
moral basis, and the firms may be interpreted as hypocritical and treated with skepticism. Without moral legitimacy, CSP 
is less likely to bring a firm benefits. The value of CSP depends on stakeholders’ perceptions and their interpretations of 
a firm’s prosocial practices. 
These results have other strong practical implications as well. First of all, they suggest that the insurance value arising 
from CSP is economically significant, adding from 2.8 percent to 3.8 percent to firm value (cf. an overall increase in firm 
value of 2.9% to 8.3% from CSP through all channels). Managers of high-risk firms should actively engage in prosocial 
activities. The more likely a firm is to need the ‘insurance’ in the future, the more it will benefit from prosocial activities 
and the more it should engage in them beforehand. Managers must monitor their firms’ risk levels and invest in prosocial 
corporate activities accordingly. 
In addition, managers can feel better assured that CSP and financial performance are not contradictory (Friedman, 1970); 
rather, they complement each other. To capture the value of good stakeholder relations, managers must realize that their 
firms need to be in good financial condition, otherwise stakeholders will not be able to appreciate their prosocial efforts, 
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and the value of their investments will be limited. Also, investment in good CSP by firms operating in socially contested 
industries may be in vain, as stakeholders are less likely to appreciate their efforts. 
A number of suggestions for future research stem from the limitations of the current study. First, while we have been 
careful in our research design and additional analyses consistently show that the insurance value of CSP documented is 
not because of high litigation risk firms having better performance than low litigation risk firms, we cannot entirely 
eliminate such possibilities. As such, our study calls for future research to further establish the robustness of CSP 
insurance value in the presence of litigation risk. Similarly, other than the potential risk of litigation, there are, of course, 
many other types of risk a firm may face. Future research might profitably explore CSP’s insurance value in the presence 
of some of these other types of risk. 
This study has demonstrated that high-risk firms are more likely to benefit from good CSP as an insurance mechanism, 
but it did not explicitly address the costs of CSP investment. While a firm’s market value represents the expected future 
benefits net of costs and, thus, implicitly incorporates the costs of prosocial activities, future research might fruitfully 
consider measuring CSP expense directly using, for example, a survey methodology. 
It should also be acknowledged that insurance protection mechanisms cannot be reduced solely to corporate social 
practices. Corporate social performance is only one among many dimensions that stakeholders use to determine a firm’s 
reputation and moral capital. A broader spectrum of firm activities should be exploited to create a safety net as part of a 
company-wide risk management strategy. This should, of course, begin with mechanisms that will prevent or minimize 
the occurrence of negative events. Firms still need to put in place good internal control systems and other conventional 
financial risk management tactics, such as using derivative securities, diversifying their investment portfolios, and so on, 
to fit the varying nature and degree of their risk exposure. Future research might fruitfully examine the interrelationships 
among CSP and other such risk management mechanisms. Are they, for example, more likely to be substitutive or 
complementary? And future research might also look into the insurance value of each dimension of stakeholder relations 
and examine which type of prosocial corporate activity is most valuable and/or effective in mitigating risk exposure. CSP 
is a multidimensional construct that encompasses a large and varied range of corporate behaviors (Carroll, 1979; Rowley 
and Berman, 2000). Different aspects of CSP are differently motivated and may, accordingly, have different implications 
for CFP (Brammer and Millington, 2008). 
The results of this study provide the first evidence that stakeholders understand and value the insurance aspect of CSP. 
Further research is required to improve our understanding of other factors and conditions that will determine CSP’s value 
to a particular firm. This naturally leads to a more ambitious and challenging future research avenue: establishing the 
optimum level of investment in corporate social activities that maximizes firm value, perhaps via both risk management 
and reputation enhancement channels. Such research would help inform managers about how to best balance their firms’ 
investments in improving CSP given their specific circumstances. Moreover, the outcomes of such proposed research 
would help establish benchmarks to enable empirical examination of potential over- or underinvestment in CSP. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Overall, the results of this study suggest that CSP can enhance firm value by functioning as an insurance mechanism. But 
its value-enhancing effects vary depending on a firm’s litigation risk. Pragmatic and moral legitimacy are essential if 
CSP is to be of any value to the firm. This study has documented the fact that CSP has ex ante insurance value over and 
above its value derived from other channels and that the contribution is economically significant. Taking firm and 
industry features into consideration may enable managers to develop a richer understanding of the financial performance 
impact of their prosocial investments. It is hoped that this study may serve as an important step toward a better 
understanding of the relationship between corporate social behavior and financial performance from the risk management 
perspective and beyond. 
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